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Controlling the Competitor Plaintiff
in Antitrust Litigation
William H. Page*
and Roger D. Blair**

In Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 1 Edward Snyder and Thomas Kauper survey a sample of private antitrust
cases from the period 1973-1983 and review critically the recent economic literature on raising rivals' costs as an exclusionary practice.
Measuring the sample against the theory, they find relatively few meritorious suits brought by competitors of the alleged offenders.2 They
also find that the antitrust injury doctrine announced in 1977 in
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc. 3 had no significant effect
on the relative frequency of competitor suits filed during the period
covered by the sample.4 This result, they conclude, suggests that
Brunswick does not curb misuse of the antitrust laws. Turning to the
present interpretation of the law, they find that careful pleading can so
easily circumvent the antitrust injury doctrine that the doctrine holds
no prospect for stemming the tide of perverse competitors' suits. 5
Plaintiffs, they argue, may easily get past the pleading stage to the
merits by modifying their complaints to include the necessary allegations of anticompetitive exclusion. Snyder and Kauper therefore recommend that the private competitor's suit be abolished and replaced
by a form of parens patriae suit on behalf of the few legitimately aggrieved competitors. 6
Much in Snyder and Kauper's study is worthy of comment. They
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Lopatka for their comments.
1. Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor
Plaintiff. 90 MICH. L. R.Ev. 551 (1991).
2. See id. at 575-76.
3. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
4. See Snyder & Kauper, supra note l, at 581.
5. See id. at 581-88.
6. See id. at 597-98. For an early argument in favor of parens patriae suits in some circumstances, see Roger D. Blair, The Sherman Act and the Incentive to Collude, 17 ANTrrRusr BULL.
433 (1972).
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have given us a useful picture of private antitrust litigation during the
period covered by the sample, one that may be more accurate than a
reading of reported cases from that period would suggest. 7 Moreover,
their generally critical treatment of the literature on raising rivals'
costs is clear and focused on the need to draw administrable policy
conclusions. 8 Most noteworthy, however, is their critique of the antitrust injury doctrine as a means of controlling unmeritorious or perverse suits by competitors. Their argument on this score - based
upon their analysis of the 1973-1983 data and some more recent antitrust injury decisions - is deeply flawed and does not support their
conclusion that competitor suits should be abolished. We argue here
that the antitrust injury requirement9 and related procedural devices
have evolved to address the problem of perverse competitor suits.
Moreover, the solution that Snyder and Kauper offer for the problem
will not likely improve upon the traditional methods of the legal
system.

I.

THE BRUNSWICK DECISION AND THE EVOLUTION OF
ANTITRUST

That Snyder and Kauper found no significant difference between
the relative number of competitors' suits filed before and after the
Brunswick decision in their sample period is neither surprising nor
consequential. The development of antitrust law - including the antitrust injury doctrine - is evolutionary. As one commentator has
noted, "the Sherman Act can be regarded as 'enabling' legislation an invitation to the federal courts to learn how businesses and markets
work and formulate a set of rules that will make them work in socially
7. For extensive examination of the Georgetown antitrust project data described in Snyder &
Kauper, supra note 1, at 554 & n.15, see PRIVATE ANrrrRUST LmGATION: NEW EVIDENCE,
NEW LEARNING (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988).
8. Snyder and Kauper's objection that the raising rivals' costs theories are essentially special
cases with no strong policy consequences is being voiced with increased frequency. They cite, for
example, Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND J.
EcoN. 113 (1989). See also Sam Peltzman, The Handbook ofIndustrial Organization: A Review
Article, 99 J. PoL. EcoN. 201, 206 (1991) (observing "the seeming inability of the recent theory
to lead to any powerful generalization. This is especially true in the area of game theory, where
this problem seems beyond remediation.").
9. We have both discussed antitrust injury at length elsewhere. For Page's work, see William
H. Page, Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors' Injury, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2151 (1990);
William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution ofAntitrust: Characterization, Antitrust
Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 15 VA. L. REv. 1221 (1989) [hereinafter Page, Chicago
School]; William H. Page, The Scope ofLiability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445
(1985); William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust
Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 467 (1980) [hereinafter Page, Damages and Efficiency]. For Blair's
work, see, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Gordon L. Lang, Albrecht After ARCO: Maximum Resale
Price Fixing Moves Toward the Rule ofReason, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1007 (1991); RogerD. Blair &
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1539 (1989).
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efficient ways.'' 10 In developing antitrust law, the federal courts follow
the familiar decisional methods of common law courts. 11 This process
requires the gradual development of standards based upon the accumulated knowledge of antitrust cases and the prevailing economic wisdom. Consequently, no single decision - especially Brunswick - can
be expected obviously and immediately to affect private plaintiffs'
gross filing rates. In dismissing the antitrust injury doctrine based on
their empirical results, Snyder and Kauper lose sight of this fundamental feature of antitrust law.
Brunswick, in particular, had little immediate impact because even
informed observers did not view it as an important decision in 1977.
Consider the following table showing the relative frequency with
which the antitrust decisions of the 1977 Supreme Court term were
noted in law reviews:12
Antitrust Cases, 1977 Supreme Court Term
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 13
Bates v. State Bar 14
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 15
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises 16
Brunswi'ck Corp. v. Pueblo Bow/-0-Mat, Inc.

Times Noted in
Law Reviews
28
26
25
6
2

These figures indicate starkly that Brunswick was not viewed as a
particularly important or interesting decision. The reasons are apparent from the opinion itself. The decision denied recovery to bowling
centers that sought treble damages for the loss of profits they would
have made had their competitors gone under instead of merging illegally with the defendant Brunswick. The Court held that plaintiffs'
harms, although causally related to an antitrust violation, were not
compensable under section 4 of the Clayton Act. Because plaintiffs
were seeking damages for an increase in competition, to permit recov10. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, EcONOMlCS AND FEDERAL A.Nrrrausr LAW 52 (1985); see
also William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins ofAntitrust Policy, 66 TuL. L. REv. l,
36 (1991). For criticism of this tradition in antitrust law, see Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the
Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 14 CAL. L. REv. 263 (1986).
11. See, e.g., HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL A.Nrrrausr POLICY 228-29 (1954) ("[l]n
adopting the standard of the common law Congress expected the courts not only to apply a set of
somewhat vague doctrines but also in so doing to make use of that 'certain technique of judicial
reasoning' characteristic of common law courts."). See generally Page, Chicago School, supra
note 9.
12. The figures are drawn from the Table of Cases Commented Upon, in 18 INDEX TO LEGAL
PERIODICALS: SEPTEMBER 1976 TO Auousr 1979, at 1481 (1980).
13. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
14. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
15. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
16. 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
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ery would, the Court said, be inconsistent with the antitrust laws.t 7
The decision seemed perfectly reasonable under virtually any interpretation of the antitrust laws.
Brunswick also, of course, announced the principle that plaintiffs
must have suffered antitrust injury, that is: "injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts
made possible by the violation." 18 In retrospect, we can see that this
passage announced a very fertile doctrine. But that doctrine, as presently understood, did not spring fully formed from the Brunswick
opinion itself like Athena from the head of Zeus; instead, Brunswick
was a step in an evolutionary process that began before the case and
has continued ever since. As Snyder and Kauper seem to recognize,
nascent forms of the antitrust injury doctrine appeared in earlier appellate decisions. 19 Moreover, the absurdity of the theory of damages
in Brunswick obscured the reach of the antitrust injury principle for
years.
Following Brunswick, some reason existed to think that the antitrust injury doctrine might be limited to cases in which the statute at
issue, like section 7 of the Clayton Act, barred practices with only an
incipient effect on competition. 20 The antitrust injury doctrine might
also have barred recovery only when the alleged offense actually increased competition. The first full-length article attempting to extend
the principle to all antitrust damage actions under an economic efficiency rationale did not appear until 1980.21 The Supreme Court resolved basic issues under the doctrine in 1981,22 1986,23 and 1990;24
some fundamental aspects of the principle remain in doubt. During
this period, the practical importance of antitrust injury in antitrust
decisionmaking has increased substantially. 2 s
17. 429 U.S. at 487-88.
18. 429 U.S. at 489.
19. See, e.g., Milton Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented
Supreme Court Term - 1977, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 979, 989 (1977) (describing Brunswick as a
"[c]larification of the [c]oncept of [a]ntitrust [i]njury" and speculating on future developments).
20. See, e.g., id. at 992 n.76.
21. See Page, Damages and Efficiency, supra note 9.
22. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
23. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
24. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
25. The term antitrust injury appeared in only 16 district court opinions in 1978, but its use
per year increased steadily thereafter, reaching a high of 58 in 1987. The figures are 1978 (16);
1979 (17); 1980 (21); 1981 (35); 1982 (36); 1983 (39); 1984 (39); 1985 (46); 1986 (54); 1987 (58):
1988 (53); 1989 (41); 1990 (39); 1991 (41). The figures are based on a Westlaw search of the
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Given the fact that the antitrust injury principle has emerged
through an evolutionary process and was not "legislated" in full form
on the date Brunswick was handed down, one would hardly expect to
see much difference between the relative frequency of filings by competitor plaintiffs shortly before and shortly after the decision. Because
antitrust injury was a relatively unformed doctrine in those years, one
can draw few conclusions from Snyder and Kauper's data about its
prospective efficacy as a means of controlling strategic or perverse suits
by competitors.

II.

ANITrRUST INJURY IN PRACTICE

The second part of Snyder and Kauper's critique of antitrust injury
does consider the present interpretation of the doctrine, but is no more
persuasive than their empirical results. After a brief review of the doctrine's requirements and its application by the courts, Snyder and
Kauper state that antitrus~ injury does not effectively bar improper
competitor suits. 26 Their principal basis for this conclusion is a comparison of the Supreme Court's decision in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of
Colorado, Inc., 2 1 and the district court's decision in Tasty Baking Co.
v. Ralston Purina Inc. 28 In Cargill, the Court extended the antitrust
injury requirement to injunction actions, holding that competitors of
merging firms could not enjoin the merger if the only harm that the
merger caused them was the result of increased efficiency. Snyder and
Kauper state that the Court "clearly indicated ... that had there been
proper allegation and proof of threatened predation, the antitrust injury requirement would have been met." 29 They then point to Tasty
Baking, a case decided shortly after Cargill, in which the district court
upheld competitor standing to challenge a merger, where the plaintiff
did allege a threat of predatory pricing by the defendant after the
merger. Snyder and Kauper continue: "The lesson for competitor
plaintiffs is clear. Allegations of anticompetitive exclusion, if properly
framed, will satisfy the antitrust injury requirement. The question
then becomes one of proof and, for all practical purposes, the case
FATR-DCT library for the term antitrust injury in each year. This increase occurred during a

period in which filings of private antitrust cases dropped from 1,457 in 1980 to 521in1990. See
Maxwell M. Blecher, The Impact of GTE Sylvania on Antitrust Jurisprudence, 60 ANTITRUST
L.J. 17, 17 & n.2 (1991), (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUSI'ICE DEPARTMENT
CHANGES IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND AcnvmES 15 (1990), reprinted in 2
Trade Reg. Reports (CCH) No. 137 (Dec. 18, 1990)).
26. See Snyder & Kauper, supra note 1, at 582-88.
27. 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
28. 653 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
29. Snyder & Kauper, supra note 1, at 585.
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must proceed to the merits. " 30 In a similar vein, they state:
In cases seeking to enjoin mergers of firms competing with the plaintiff, courts must struggle with proof of potential predation. . . . How
proximate must such acts be? Presumably plaintiff must do more than
allege such future acts. But neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts
have offered guidance on such questions. The mere act of pleading that
such conduct is likely will apparently carry the plaintiff a long way into
the litigation. 31

This account of the state of the law is at best incomplete.
Although Cargill rejected the contention that competitor plaintiffs
should never be permitted to challenge mergers, it did, contrary to
Snyder and Kauper's suggestion, provide extended dicta "offering guidance" on how to identify antitrust injury in such a setting. 32 The
Court made clear, as it had already done in Matsushita Electric Industrial Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 33 that it generally accepted the Chicago analysis of predatory pricing, which views claims of predatory
pricing with great skepticism: "Claims of threatened injury from
predatory pricing must, of course, be evaluated with care."34 In Matsushita, the Court required a greater than usual evidentiary showing to
survive a summary judgment motion where the plaintiff's allegations
were inherently implausible, as in the case of predatory pricing.35
Likewise, under Cargill's standards, bare allegations of threatened
predatory pricing are inadequate to establish antitrust injury; the circumstances must be such as to make such an allegation credible.
"Courts should not find allegations of predatory pricing credible when
the alleged predator is incapable of successfully pursuing a predatory
scheme."36 The Court in Cargill emphasized that the merging firms'
28.4% postmerger market share would have made predatory pricing
impossible. Moreover, the Court specifically admonished courts hearing such cases to take account of postmerger entry barriers, because an
allegation of likely successful predatory pricing would be implausible if
firms could easily reenter the market when the alleged predator would
supposedly be seeking to recoup. 37 One district court's dubious inter30. Id.
31. Id. at 587 (footnote omitted).
32. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 119 n.15.
33. 475 U.S. 574, 588-90 (1986).
34. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 121 n.17. The Court continued: "[T]he obstacles to the successful
execution of a strategy of predation are manifold, and .•• the disincentives to engage in such a
strategy are accordingly numerous." 479 U.S. at 121 n.17 (citing the leading Chicago
commentators).
35. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 596-97.
36. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 120 n.15.
37. In evaluating entry barriers in the context of a predatory pricing claim, however, a
court should focus on whether significant entry barriers would exist after the merged firm
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pretation of the Court's admonitions is insUfficient to dismiss antitrust
injury as a legitimate filter for competitor plaintiffs.
The Court's recent decision in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co. 38 (ARCO) emphasizes once again that a competitor may not
satisfy the antitrust injury requirement merely by alleging that a violation occurred and that it harmed the competitor in some way. More
importantly, the case illustrates plaintiffs' difficulties in tailoring allegations to satisfy the antitrust injury requirement. The plaintiff's entire case in ARCO rested on ARCO's alleged violation of the
Albrecht 39 rule prohibiting maximum resale price fixing. The Court
found that none of the supposed rationales for the Albrecht rule supported a finding of antitrust injury to a competitor. To satisfy ARCO,
a competitor will have to meet the extraordinary burden of plausibly
alleging a campaign of predation against retail service stations.
In our view, Tasty Baking's interpretation of the Cargill standards
was questionable at best. Similarly disturbing was the Second Circuit's Bigelow decision, 40 which reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment to defendants on the competitor's request for a
preliminary injunction against a merger. The appellate court found
that a merger creating a firm with an eighty-four percent market share
created a "presumption" of antitrust injury to competitors,41 despite
the district court's finding in the same case that there was no evidence
of a likelihood of predation.42 Tasty Baking and Bigelow, however, are
of dubious vitality. Other cases have been truer to the Court's admonitions in Cargill 43 It is especially unlikely that Bigelow's presumphad eliminated some of its rivals, because at that point the remaining firms would begin to
charge supracompetitive prices, and the barriers that existed during the competitive conditions might well prove insignificant.
479 U.S. at 120 n.15; see also Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964
F.2d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[P]redatory pricing must involve in addition to some level of
below-cost pricing that is harmful to competition, the rational expectation of later realizing monopoly profits. The failure to show this additional aspect is fatal."); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v.
Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbook, J.) (In a predatory
pricing case, "[o]nly if a market structure makes recoupment feasible need a court inquire into
the relation between price and cost."), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990).
38. 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
39. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
40. R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 815
(1989).
41. 867 F.2d at 111 ("Market share data ••. constitute[] sufficient evidence •.• of antitrust
injury to a competitor to create a genuine issue for trial.") (citing Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston
Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1265 (E.D. Pa. 1987)).
42. See R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 689 F. Supp. 76, 80-81 (D. Conn. 1988), revd.,
867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 815 (1989).
43. See, e.g., Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1023 (1988); see also Ansell Inc. v. Schmid Labs., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 467, 484-85
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tion that a high market share implies injury to competitors survives
ARCO.
The litigation in Remington Products, Inc. v. North American
Philips Corp. 44 is instructive on this point. There, the plaintiff sought
damages as a result of a completed merger of its competitors. The
district court initially granted defendant's motion for summary judgment under Cargill then reversed itself following Bigelow. 45 Recently,
however, the district court reversed itself once again on the basis of
ARCO, concluding that Bigelow's presumption that an illegal merger
would inflict antitrust injury on a competitor did not survive AR CO. 46
The evolving standards of antitrust injury appear to provide a "lesson
for competitor plaintiffs" that is quite different from the one Snyder
and Kauper draw. Mere allegations of predatory intent will not suffice, and the likelihood of a court's finding antitrust injury from a
merger of one's competitors is remote, even when the defendant's market share is quite high.
The key issue in all of this is whether courts, using the antitrust
injury doctrine to focus litigation on the efficiency consequences of
practices, can distinguish anticompetitive exclusion from efficient
practices at a sufficiently early stage in the proceedings to prevent perverse competitors' suits. Unmeritorious suits that survive summary
judgment increase congestion in an already overburdened court system. Moreover, the cost of defending such suits may lead to inefficient
settlements. Courts may ameliorate many of these difficulties by ruling expeditiously on summary judgment motions; Snyder and Kauper
suggest, however, that they cannot:
[P]laintiffs claiming injuries through strategic or predatory actions of
their competitors are likely to satisfy the antitrust injury requirement
once the facts establishing the violation are shown. The courts tend to
presume that the factual premise of the claim is valid and then inquire
whether the plaintiffs stand to suffer antitrust injury from the alleged
behavior. Because the antitrust injury requirement is not likely to serve
as a significant limitation on such actions, plaintiffs suing direct competitors may be expected to shape their complaints to conform to current
theories of predation or raising rivals' costs. Such complaints are likely
to withstand initial scrutiny; the question of antitrust injury in these
cases will often be determined only when the underlying question of violation is resolved. As a result, the antitrust injury requirement is not
(D.N.J. 1991) (finding injury from "marketing clout" or popularity of competing brand not anti·
trust injury).
44. 717 F. Supp. 36 (D. Conn. 1989).
45. 717 F. Supp. at 48-49.
46. Remington Prods., Inc. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 755 F. Supp. 52, 57-58 (D. Conn.
1991).
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likely to curb the type of suits most likely to be filed against competitors
to restrain competition: those based on allegations that what is in reality
aggressive and effective competition is a form of predatory or exclusionary conduct. 47

This passage again suggests that antitrust injury's requirement that the
plaintiff allege some credible link between its harm and a genuinely
anticompetitive exclusionary practice is of no consequence, because
the plaintiff may simply allege whatever the court wants to hear. But
in most cases no credible allegations of what Snyder and Kauper call
the "necessary conditions" for successful exclusion will be possible. In
ARCO, for example, the plaintiffs could hardly have plausibly alleged
a predatory pricing scheme given a market with virtually no entry
barriers.48
Snyder and Kauper suggest that such unmeritorious cases will
nonetheless be filed, and that only a rule completely barring competitor suits will be effective.49 But no rule, not even the one recommended by Snyder and Kauper, can absolutely prevent a firm from
filing a baseless lawsuit. The question must be whether the legal system has at its disposal a means of deterring such suits by making the
prospective gains from filing them less than the prospective costs. The
courts must, in other words, be able to weed out baseless suits at an
early stage of the litigation or to impose sanctions that deter their filing in the first place.
Courts need not dismiss cases on the pleadings to meet this condition. Snyder and Kauper indicate that if the plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss the case must proceed "to the merits." But cases may
be won on the merits without a trial. Under the Court's current standards, the defendant need only show the absence of adequate proof in
the record of an essential element of the plaintiff's claim to win sum47. Snyder & Kauper, supra note 1, at 587.
48. Plaintiff will, however, apparently have the opportunity to try. On remand from the
Supreme Court's decision in ARCO, the Ninth Circuit majority found that the district court must
hear plaintiff's predatory pricing claim, despite the dissent's persuasive argument that plaintiff
had abandoned it. USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 87-5681, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18445 (9th Cir. Apr. 16, 1992). Still more dubiously, the majority found that plaintiff
need not show that there was a dangerous probability that the alleged predatory pricing would
succeed, reasoning that the "dangerous probability" standard applies only to § 2 cases. 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 18445 at *15. Although dangerous probability is indeed a§ 2 requirement, in
a broader sense it is inseparable from any coherent definition of predatory pricing. A price cannot be predatory unless the defendant will probably be successful in recouping the losses it suffers
during the predatory campaign by setting supracompetitive prices after plaintiff is driven from
the market.
49. See Snyder & Kauper, supra note 1, at 587-88, 596-97. For an argument to the opposite
effect, from the opposite ideological viewpoint, see John B. McArthur & Thomas W. Paterson,
The Effects of Monsanto, Matsushita, and Sharp on the Plaintiff's Incentive to Sue, 23 CONN. L.
REV. 333 (1991).
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mary judgment. so After AR CO, discovery can focus on issues of market power and entry barriers, facilitating early disposition of
unmeritorious cases. s1
The increased availability of summary judgment, especially since
Matsushita, has had a dramatic effect on antitrust litigation. One survey of reported summary judgment decisions in antitrust conspiracy
cases since Matsushita found that sixty-four of the decisions granted
summary judgment while only thirteen denied it - and one of those
thirteen denials was the Ninth Circuit's decision in ARCO that the
Supreme Court later reversed. 52 While judges are admittedly more
likely to write opinions when granting rather than denying summary
judgment, these figures are impressive. Snyder and Kauper's statement that the number of summary judgment motions granted "is still
low" 53 is bewildering. To be sure, summary judgment normally comes
only after some discovery and so may entail significant costs to the
defendant. But few plaintiffs file suit with the knowledge that they will
lose on summary judgment. Those who do so risk sanctions under
Rule 11. 54 The number of private antitrust cases filed per year has
plummeted by almost two thirds since 1980,55 in part for these
reasons.
Even if summary judgment is denied, the proceedings need not be
unduly protracted. In Ansell Inc. v. Schmid Laboratories, Inc., 56 a
merger agreement was signed on August 28, 1990, and a competitor's
suit challenging the merger was filed on September 13, 1990. The
court denied summary judgment on November 13, 1990, but began
hearings on plaintiff's application for a permanent injunction the same
day. The court heard evidence on three days over the following three
weeks and rendered its decision denying relief (on antitrust injury
grounds) on February 27, 1991, barely six months after the signing of
50. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
51. See Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 133 F.R.D. 41, 45 (D. Nev. 1990) (limiting
discovery, in light of ARCO, to issues of monopoly power and entry barriers, because relevance
of other discovery was contingent on these issues).
52. Harry Zirlin, Note, Summary Judgment in Federal Court: New Maxims for a Familiar
Rule, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 201, 218 & n.125 (1989).
53. Snyder & Kauper, supra note 1, at 559 n.37.
54. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985). For an
argument that the standards for Rule 11 sanctions in antitrust cases are still too lenient, see
Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden Anniversary J'iew
of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1023, 1056-59 (1989). Louis recommends increased use of attorney fee
shifting. Id. at 1059-61. Such a measure may involve chilling some legitimate claims, as Louis
recognizes, but it falls far short of cutting off those claims entirely.
55. See Blecher, supra note 25, at 17 n.2.
56. 757 F. Supp. 467 (D.N.J. 1991).
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the merger agreement. 57 Clearly, the federal courts can move expeditiously when the case demands it.
Snyder and Kauper's own data suggest that courts have terminated
most competitor suits either on the pleadings or on summary judgment. Moreover, their own review of fairly limited information about
the cases leads them to conclude that only a small percentage are meritorious. Why should courts, properly guided by the appropriate economic understanding and the available legal mechanisms, be unable to
do the same? If courts were to apply Snyder and Kauper's standards
of classical market power and high entry barriers, they might be able
to do a more effective job in weeding out perverse suits than they have
done in the past using traditional judicial methods.
III.

THE PROBLEM OF RAISING RivALS' COSTS

Snyder and Kauper concede that summary judgment based upon
the requirement of market power "is becoming common in a variety of
antitrust cases." 58 They nonetheless believe that summary judgment
will be ineffective in the future, even in tandem with the antitrust injury requirement, in controlling perverse competitors' suits because of
the special dangers posed by the literature on raising rivals' costs:
But as competitor plaintiffs seek to work their way around the antitrust injury requirement, they are also likely to seize upon evolving theories of nonprice predation based upon proof of conduct that raises rivals'
costs. The rationale of the Monfort case suggests that such allegations, if
proved, may well establish antitrust injury. Control of these actions
through summary judgment could prove difficult given the generality of
the economics literature on exclusionary practices. Moreover, . . . even
when such firms employ exclusionary devices and the injury to rivals is
clear cut, the economics literature on exclusion of rivals indicates that
consumers' welfare may be enhanced rather than harmed. 59

The argument here appears to be that the problem of perverse suits is
likely to get worse in the future because of the ambiguities of the economic literature on raising rivals' costs; therefore, we should cut off all
competitors' suits as a prophylactic measure.
This argument faces three difficulties. First, the concept of raising
rivals' costs has not yet had a significant effect on antitrust litigation.
Despite antitrust scholars' preoccupation with raising rivals' costs,
only a few cases have used the term, and the leading law review article
advancing the notion as a basis for liability has been cited by a court
57.
second
58.
59.

757 F. Supp. at 469. Still more impressive, a new judge was assigned to the case after the
hearing day. 757 F. Supp. at 469 n.1.
Snyder & Kauper, supra note 1, at 588.
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exactly once, five years ago. 60 Moreover, the number of private antitrust cases filed has fallen dramatically in recent years, 61 suggesting
that the present federal judiciary is not particularly receptive to innovative theories of liability.62
Second, Snyder and Kauper's argument addresses the problem
posed by the literature on raising rivals' costs in an indiscriminate
way. Let us grant that plaintiffs are likely to assert the new theories of
anticompetitive exclusion in the future to circumvent the antitrust injury requirement. Let us also concede Snyder and Kauper's argument
that the observable conditions for many of those theories, particularly
those dealing with vertical integration or exclusive contracts, are as
consistent with enhancement of consumer welfare as with anticompetitive exclusion. These premises do not compel the conclusion that all
competitor suits should be foreclosed. The concerns Snyder and
Kauper raise relate to the new theories of anticompetitive exclusion
themselves, not to the antitrust injury doctrine. Snyder and Kauper
recognize that some exclusionary practices are demonstrably anticompetitive. If the practices described in the literature on raising rivals'
costs stand outside that category, the proper legal response is to reject
those theories as a basis for liability. 63 And again, there seems little
reason to fear that the present federal judiciary will not demand the
necessary proof of inefficient exclusion. 64
Finally, Snyder and Kauper's argument against the theories of
raising rivals' costs applies regardless of who enforces them, competitors or public enforcement agencies. Their suggestion that competitors are less likely than public enforcers to exercise suitable discretion
in filing antitrust suits is therefore irrelevant: The theories, on Snyder
60. Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Assn., 814 F.2d 358, 368 (7th
Cir. 1987) (citing Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986)). The article has, of
course, been cited by dozens of commentators.
61. See Blecher, supra note 25, at 17 n.2.
62. See generally William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in the
1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 49 (1991).
63. Several commentators have criticized the raising rivals' costs theories as adding little or
nothing to traditional antitrust analysis of anticompetitive exclusion. See, e.g., Timothy J. Brennan, Understanding "Raising Rivals' Costs," 33 ANrrrRUST BULL. 95, 113 (1988); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Restricted Distribution, and the Market for Exclusionary Rights, 71
MINN. L. REv. 1293, 1295 (1987); Wesley J. Liebeler, What Are the Alternatives to Chicago?,
1987 DUKE L.J. 879, 894; see also John E. Lopatka & Paul E. Godek, Another Look at Alcoa:
Raising Rivals' Costs Does Not Improve the View, 35 J,L. & EcoN. (forthcoming Oct. 1992). For
further discussion, see Nonprice Predation Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 1991 A.B.A. SEC.
ANrrrRUST L. MONOGRAPH 18.
64. For a good example of the courts' skepticism, see Ansell Inc. v. Schmid Labs., Inc., 757
F. Supp. 467, 484-85 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding that injury from "marketing clout" or popularity of
competing brand displacing plaintiff's product from shelves was not antitrust injury).
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and Kauper's account, offer no basis for distinguishing anticompetitive
from procompetitive practices.65 Moreover, the enforcement agencies
are no more likely to be skeptical of the relevant theories. After all,
economists at the Federal Trade Commission - Steven Salop and
David Scheffman - have played the leading role in producing and
promoting the literature on raising rivals' costs.
CONCLUSION

We have argued that Snyder and Kauper ignored the evolutionary
nature of legal change in interpreting from data showing that competitor suits were filed equally frequently before and after Brunswick.
Snyder and Kauper's proposed solution suffers from the same failing.
Cutting off all competitor suits prevents the courts from responding to
theoretical developments in traditional ways. Undoubtedly, courts
have been misled by fashionable theoretical developments. But antitrust policy and academic industrial organization economics have interacted productively for over a century. 66 Antitrust has provided the
subject matter for much of the empirical and theoretical work of industrial organization, which has in turn contributed to the development of antitrust. Snyder and Kauper's argument is insufficient to
justify abandonment of a major part of that joint enterprise.

65. Others have made the same observation. See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, Comments on Presentation ofSteven C Sa/op, 56 ANTrrRusr L.J. 65, 68-69 (1987); Frank H. Easterbrook, A/locating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 16 GEO. L.J. 305, 314 (1987) (arguing that Krattenmaker
and Salop's analysis "does not contain a single example that would support a confident conclusion that firms raised rivals' costs in a way that permitted them to increase their own prices and
profits").
66. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial
Organization, 68 TEXAS L. REV. 105 (1989).

